



The Impact of Foreclosures 
on the Housing Market 
Daniel Hartley
A record number of mortgage loans are either in default or in danger of being defaulted upon. Many of the proper-
ties that back these loans will end up going through the foreclosure process. A growing body of research shows that 
foreclosed homes sell at a discount and that foreclosures have a negative impact on the value of other homes that are 
nearby. The effect on nearby property values happens for two different reasons, but my recent work suggests that one 
or the other predominates depending on certain characteristics of the neighborhood where the foreclosures are occur-
ring. This ﬁ  nding implies that different approaches might be required to mitigate the negative effects of foreclosures in 
different neighborhoods.
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About 2 million homes are somewhere in the midst of the 
foreclosure process, according to RealtyTrac. Most of these 
have yet to go on the auction block, and nearly a fourth 
are owned by the lenders who provided or purchased the 
homes’ mortgages. More foreclosures are coming—accord-
ing to the Mortgage Bankers Association, the number of 
mortgages in foreclosure or more than 90 days delinquent is 
at a record high of about 4.2 million. 
Such a large supply of homes in or near foreclosure has the 
potential to have a major impact on home prices. Foreclosed 
homes typically sell at a discount, perhaps because the ho-
meowners neglected to keep them up or because lenders are 
willing to mark properties down in hopes of selling them 
more quickly. Foreclosures also have a tendency to lower 
the prices of other homes nearby. 
Recent studies have estimated the magnitude of these ef-
fects—and they’re substantial. My own research suggests 
that the way foreclosures affect housing prices depends on 
the characteristics of the neighborhood in which they occur. 
That ﬁ  nding implies we may need to use different strategies 
to mitigate the problems caused by foreclosure. 
Some Evidence on the Size of the Impact 
How much of a discount do foreclosed and nearby prop-
erties sell for? John Campbell, Stefano Giglio, and Parag 
Pathak studied home prices in Massachusetts and estimated 
that foreclosure-related sales have prices about 27 percent 
lower than comparable properties. They also estimated that 
each foreclosure lowered the selling price of other (non-
foreclosure) properties within a radius of about 260 feet by 
nearly 1 percent. 
In one of the ﬁ  rst studies to examine the link between 
foreclosures and home prices, Dan Immergluck and Geoff 
Smith found something similar: their data showed that each 
foreclosure depressed the value of homes within 660 feet by 
0.9 percent. Looking at home prices in New York City from 
2000 to 2005, Jenny Schuetz, Vicki Been, and Ingrid Gould 
Ellen measured a somewhat smaller discount. 
While a 1 percent drop in housing prices may not seem 
terribly large, it can become hefty, since this effect increases 
with the number of foreclosures. If there were ﬁ  ve foreclo-
sures in the same vicinity, for instance, the discount would 
be around 5 percent. 
Two Paths to Lower Home Prices 
There are two different ways in which foreclosures can im-
pact the prices of nearby homes. The ﬁ  rst is that they add 
to the supply of homes that are currently on the market. 
A larger number of homes for sale in a particular market 
may translate into lower prices or a longer waiting time 
until a sale is realized. 
But a wave of foreclosures may have an even bigger effect 
on nearby home prices than a simple glut of homes for sale 
would. Typically, after homeowners have been foreclosed 
upon, they are left with a blemish on their credit history. 
They may be explicitly prohibited from getting certain types 
of mortgages for a number of years by the dominant mort-
gage providers or insurers in the market. The Federal Hous-
ing Authority (FHA), for example, typically will not lend to 
a borrower that has been foreclosed upon in the past three 
years. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have similar exclusions 
except that they usually last for ﬁ  ve to seven years. This means that the former home-owner will most likely rent or 
move in with family for a number of years. This is important 
because unless the foreclosed home is converted to a rental 
property, the foreclosure will result in an additional home on 
the market, but no addition to the pool of potential buyers. 
This effect could be mitigated if there were arbitrageurs 
waiting to step into the market and buy formerly owner-
occupied homes and quickly convert them to rental housing. 
However, this may not happen quickly if local ordinances 
make the conversion costly or if rental tenants have less 
incentive than owners to care for homes. (Joseph Williams 
shows that this may be particularly relevant for single-family 
homes and small multi-family buildings.) 
In the absence of quick rental conversion, the addition of 
a unit of supply to the inventory of houses on the market 
without the addition of a household to the pool of potential 
buyers is likely to result in lower prices for nearby homes. I 
refer to this mechanism as a “supply” effect, although it could 
just as easily be called a supply-and-negative-demand effect. 
The second way by which foreclosures can have negative 
effects on the values of nearby properties is by causing some 
kind of “negative externality.” That is, the mere presence of 
a foreclosed home might diminish the desirability of a neigh-
borhood. Two examples show how it can happen.
First, the condition of a foreclosed home may be much 
worse than that of the surrounding homes. Homeowners 
may lack the incentive to maintain their property if they 
know that they will probably be evicted from it in the near 
future. Brian Melzer found evidence that homeowners who 
owe more than their homes are worth (have negative equity) 
invested, on average, $215 less per year in home improve-
ments and maintenance than those with positive equity. 
Chris Foote, Kristopher Gerardi, and Paul Willen showed 
that negative equity can play a role in the decision to default 
on a mortgage. Thus, even before foreclosure, and certainly 
during the course of a foreclosure, to the extent that deferred 
maintenance and lack of investment is visible, it is possible 
that it could diminish the desirability of a neighborhood and 
exert a negative effect on the prices of properties nearby. 
Homes may also sit vacant for a period following a fore-
closure, possibly providing a haven for criminal activity. 
In another study of Chicago, Dan Immergluck and Geoff 
Smith looked at neighborhoods (using census tracts to de-
ﬁ  ne them) and found that foreclosure rates were positively 
correlated with violent crime rates, even after controlling for 
a large number of neighborhood characteristics. 
Economists often refer to desirable conditions like good 
weather and great schools, which exert positive effects on 
housing values, as “amenities.” In like fashion, I refer to 
conditions like a poorly maintained home or one attracting 
criminals, which exert a negative effect on housing values, 
as “disamenities.”
The size of the potential problem is suggested by ﬁ  gures 1 
and 2. Figure 1 shows how much the supply of potential 
nuisance properties (those in foreclosure or more than 90 
days delinquent) has grown. Figure 2 shows data from Equi-
fax credit reports, published by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York. Currently, almost half a million more people 
each quarter are receiving a ﬂ  ag in their credit history, indi-
cating a new foreclosure. 
To grasp the signiﬁ  cance of these ﬁ  gures, we can crudely 
estimate the amount of time it might take to work through 
the current foreclosure inventory of 2 million homes. A 
Census study issued in 1996 projected that the number of 
households living in the United States would rise to about 
115 million by 2010, growing by about 1.2 million house-
holds per year around that time. The projections from 1996 
give an idea of what one would have expected the house-
hold formation rate to be had there been no housing boom 
and bust. 
Figure 2.  Number of New Households with 
Foreclosure on Credit Report
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association.
Figure 1.  Number of Loans 90 Days or More 
Delinquent or in Foreclosure 
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QuarterAssuming that each consumer in the Equifax data lives in 
either a one- or two-adult household, the data imply that 
about 1-2 million households per year will be excluded from 
the owner-occupied housing market for at least three years. 
Assuming, again conservatively, that 1 million of the 1.2 
million new households per year are owner-occupiers, then 
the size of new demand for homes going forward will be 
2-3 million (new households plus borrowers with expiring 
foreclosure ﬂ  ags). Even if the ﬂ  ow of consumers receiving 
foreclosure ﬂ  ags were to stop immediately, it would still take 
more than a half year for this level of demand to deplete 
the current inventory of foreclosures. This estimate makes a 
number of conservative assumptions, so the amount of time 
is likely to be longer.
How Much Does Each Effect Contribute 
to Falling Home Prices? 
It is clear from the evidence that foreclosures have a negative 
effect on the value of nearby property. How much of this ef-
fect is due to “supply” and how much is due to “disamenity”? 
One clue comes from a study by John Harding, Eric Rosenb-
latt, and Vincent Yao. They discovered that the timing of the 
negative impact of foreclosures is different for homes that are 
closer to the foreclosed property than for those that are farther 
away. Homes within 300 feet take the hit just before the fore-
closure auction, while the impact for homes 300 feet to 500 
feet away peaks much later, when the lender sells the property 
after it has become REO (after the foreclosure auction). They 
interpret this pattern as suggestive evidence that foreclosures 
within 300 feet depress property values by way of the disame-
nity effect, while foreclosures that are between 300 and 500 
feet away pull down prices by way of the supply effect. 
In a recent study, I took a different approach to determining 
the extent of these two effects (“The Effect of Foreclosures on 
Nearby Housing Prices: Supply or Disamenity?”). I investi-
gated whether foreclosures of rental buildings have different 
effects on nearby single-family home prices than foreclosures 
of single-family homes. One would expect foreclosures on 
rental buildings and single-family homes to be similar in that 
they both create a disamenity for nearby property. But they 
should differ in that the foreclosure of a rental building does 
not add to the supply of owner-occupied housing and it will 
not remove a household from the pool of potential owner-
occupiers like the foreclosure of a single-family home will. So, 
foreclosures of rental buildings should have only a disamenity 
effect, while single-family home foreclosures should have both 
a disamenity and a supply effect. 
Using data covering a decade of housing transactions and 
foreclosures in Chicago, I found that the size of the supply 
and disamenity effects varies by the “tightness” of the housing 
market in the surrounding neighborhood. In neighborhoods 
with low vacancy rates (tight markets), foreclosures lower 
the prices of nearby single-family houses by way of the sup-
ply effect. I estimate that housing prices within 250 feet of a 
foreclosure are lowered by about 1.6 percent per foreclosure 
through the supply effect, while the disamenity effect is about 
zero. In contrast, in neighborhoods with high vacancy rates 
(“looser” markets), foreclosures lower prices of nearby single-
family houses by way of the disamenity effect. I estimate that 
housing prices within 250 feet of a foreclosure are lowered by 
about 2 percent per foreclosure through the disamenity effect, 
while the supply effect is about zero. 
Implications for Housing Policy
Foreclosures affect housing markets in a number of ways. 
Those ways appear to differ depending on the characteristics 
of the neighborhood in which the foreclosures occur. While 
the size of the total effect is similar in low-vacancy-rate and 
high-vacancy-rate neighborhoods, the fact that it is operating 
through different mechanisms suggests that different policy 
prescriptions may be appropriate in different neighborhoods. 
In low-vacancy-rate neighborhoods, where foreclosures affect 
nearby property values through the supply effect, the best 
strategy may be to meter out the foreclosed properties at a 
rate slow enough to avoid ﬂ  ooding the market. In contrast, in 
high-vacancy-rate neighborhoods, where foreclosures affect 
nearby property values through the disamenity effect, the 
most important issue is making sure that properties are kept 
up and do not sit vacant. This suggests that it is important to 
make sure that owners have an equity stake in their homes, 
which can be achieved through principal write-downs or by a 
quick foreclosure process and sale of the property at the cur-
rent market price to a buyer who will live in the home. 
Finally, it is important to realize that even if the current 
elevated foreclosure rate fell back to its historical average, it 
would take several years to transition the stock of households 
that have recently defaulted back to potential home buyers. 
Because of disamenities and the reduction of the pool of 
households that are eligible to get mortgages, the fact that 
The Foreclosure Process 
The foreclosure process may vary signiﬁ  cantly across states and even across counties, but the following description is general enough that it 
should be applicable to most of the United States. 
Auction. At some point, the borrower will 
be asked to vacate the home, and if neces-
sary, at some later point the borrower will 
be compelled to vacate the home by local 
authorities. The home will then go up for 
auction. 
REO. If the auction bids do not reach a high 
enough level to cover the outstanding bal-
ance of the loan, the lender can take owner-
ship of the property. Once the lender owns 
the property (referred to as real-estate-owned 
or REO), it will typically remain vacant until 
the lender is able to sell it.
Delinquency and foreclosure. After a 
homeowner with a mortgage loan has 
missed three monthly payments, he or she 
is considered to be “90 days delinquent,” 
and the servicer of the mortgage (the com-
pany to which the mortgage payments are 
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1.5 percent of all housing units are in foreclosure has a bigger 
effect on housing prices than if 1.5 percent of households were 
to suddenly sell their homes and buy other homes. 
The results presented here highlight the fact that foreclosures 
may have differing impacts depending upon the characteristics 
of the neighborhood in which they occur.
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